We study the executive compensation structure in the largest 14 U.S. financial institutions during 2000-2008. Our results are mostly consistent with and supportive of the findings of Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann (2010) , that is, managerial incentives matterincentives generated by executive compensation programs led to excessive risk-taking by banks leading to the current financial crisis. Also, our results are generally not supportive of the conclusions of Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) that the poor performance of banks during the crisis was the result of unforeseen risk.
Introduction
Policy makers at the highest levels continue to be engaged with the ongoing global financial crisis. Factors that have been identified as contributing to this crisis include misguided government policies to an absence of market discipline of financial institutions that had inadequate or flawed risk-monitoring and incentive systems.
1 Such government policies include low interest rates by the Federal Reserve and promotion of subprime risk-taking by government-sponsored entities dominating the residential mortgage market so as to increase home ownership by those who could not otherwise afford it. Sources of inadequate market discipline include ineffective prudential regulation including capital requirements that favored securitized subprime loans over more conventional assets. Internal organizational factors contributing to the crisis include business strategies dependent on high leverage and short-term financing of long-term assets, reliance on risk and valuation models with grossly unrealistic assumptions, and poorly-designed incentive compensation. These factors, taken as a whole, encouraged what was, as can readily be observed with the benefit of hindsight, excessive risktaking.
However, of the items on the extensive list of factors contributing to the crisis only one issue has consistently been a focal point of the reform agenda across nations: executive compensation. In the United States, for example, multiple legislative and regulatory initiatives have regulated the compensation of executives of financial institutions receiving government assistance. The governments of many European nations have followed a similar regulatory strategy, while the European Union's Competition Commissioner has announced that it will be examining banks' compensation in light of government support received during the crisis. 2 An important assumption behind these regulatory reform efforts is the supposition that incentives generated by executive compensation programs led to excessive risk-taking. In an insightful recent paper, Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann (2010) study the compensation structure of the top executives in Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers and conclude, "…given the structure of executives' payoffs, the possibility that risk-taking decisions were influenced by incentives
should not be dismissed but rather taken seriously." We refer to this as the Managerial
Incentives Hypothesis: Incentives generated by executive compensation programs led to excessive risk-taking by banks leading to the current financial crisis; the excessive risk-taking would benefit bank executives at the expense of the long-term shareholders.
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) focus on the large losses experienced by CEOs of financial institutions via the declines in the value of their ownership in their company's stock and stock option during the crisis and conclude, "Bank CEO incentives cannot be blamed for the credit crisis or for the performance of banks during that crisis." They argue that bank CEOs and senior executives could not or did not foresee the extreme high risk nature of some of the bank's investment and trading strategies. The poor performance of these banks during the crisis is attributable to an extremely negative realization of the high risk nature of their investment and trading strategy. We refer to this as the Unforeseen Risk Hypothesis: Bank executives were 2 Regulating bank executives' compensation took a prominent place on the agenda of the October 2009 G-20 summit, which produced a set of principles as a guideline for nations' regulation of financial executives' pay. Jonathan Weisman, Obama Retakes Global Stage, but With Diminished Momentum, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 19-20, 2009 , (noting that French President Nicolas Sarkozy threatened to walk out of the G-20 summit if leaders do not adopt strict compensation limits for financial executives).
faithfully working in the interests of their long-term shareholders; the poor performance of their banks during the crisis was the result of unforeseen risk of the bank's investment and trading strategy.
The Unforeseen Risk Hypothesis is supported by the Culture of Ownership that many banks publicly revere and espouse. 3 Per this Culture of Ownership, bank employees -especially senior executives -are supposed to have significant stock ownership in their bank such that their incentives are aligned with that of the long-term shareholders.
We study the executive compensation structure in the largest 14 U.S. financial institutions during [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] , and compare it with that of CEOs of 37 U.S. banks that neither sought nor received Trouble Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds from the U.S. Treasury. We refer to the above 14 banks as the "too-big-to-fail" TBTF banks, and the other 37 banks as No-TARP banks. We focus on the CEO's buys and sells of their bank's stock, purchase of stock via option exercise, and their salary and bonus during [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . We consider the capital losses these CEOs incur due to the dramatic share price declines in 2008. We compare the shareholder returns for these 14 TBTF banks and the 37 No-TBTF banks. Finally, we consider three measures of risk-taking by these banks: (a) the bank's Z-score (number of standard deviations below the mean bank profit by which the profit would have to fall before the bank's equity loses all value), (b) the bank's asset write-downs, and (c) whether or not a bank borrows capital from various Fed bailout programs, and the amount of such capital.
Our results are mostly consistent with and supportive of the findings of Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann (2010) , that is, managerial incentives matter: incentives generated by executive compensation programs led to excessive risk-taking by banks and contributing to the current financial crisis. Also, our results are generally not supportive of the conclusions of Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) that the poor performance of banks during the crisis was the result of unforeseen risk. interests and avoid excessive risk-taking. Section 6 presents our proposal for bank capitalization reform which is complementary to the manager incentive compensation proposal.
Section 7 focuses on board compensation. The final section concludes with a summary.
Managerial Incentives Hypothesis versus the Unforeseen Risk Hypothesis
The Managerial Incentives Hypothesis posits that incentives generated by executive compensation programs led to excessive risk-taking by banks and contributing to the current financial crisis. The excessive risk-taking would benefit bank executives at the expense of the long-term shareholders; that is, projects that led to the excessive risk-taking were ex ante valuediminishing (negative net present value).
How might the incentives generated by executive compensation programs in banks lead to their excessive risk-taking and benefit these executives at the expense of long-term shareholders? Consider an investment project or trading strategy that in any given year can lead to six cash flow outcomes with equal probability: $500 million, $500 million, $500 million, $500 million, $500 million, and the sixth outcome is -$5 billion (a loss of $5 billion). 4 The probability and the magnitude of the cash flows of the six outcomes are known only to the bank executives. However, given the information disclosed to the investing public, the stock market is led to believe that the trading strategy can lead to the following six annual cash flow outcomes with equal probability: $500 million, $500 million, $500 million, $500 million, $500 million, and the sixth outcome is -$1 billion (a loss of $1 billion).
5
How should the bank executives respond to the above investment strategy if they were acting in the interest of the long-term shareholders? Since these six outcomes are equally likely, the expected cash flow from this trading strategy is negative -given what the bank executives know. Hence, the bank should not engage in this trading strategy. 4 These cash flows and probabilities have been simplified for illustrative purposes to clarify the intuition of our argument. Instead of the abovementioned cash flows and probabilities, it would be straightforward to consider a project with a 99% probability of a cash flow of $500 million, and a 1% probability of a loss of $100 billion. More complicated cash flows and probabilities can be considered; all we need from this numerical illustration is the project have a negative net present value.
5 Continuing with the numerical example noted in the above footnote: Given the information disclosed to the investing public, the stock market is led to believe that the trading strategy has a 99% probability of a cash flow of $500 million, and a 1% probability of a loss of $10 billion. Again, more complicated cash flows and probabilities can be considered; all we need from this numerical illustration is the project be perceived to have a positive net present value.
Will the bank executives invest in the above trading strategy? To answer this, we have to consider the compensation structure of the bank executives or CEO. Assume the bank CEO owns a significant number of bank shares, say, 100 million shares. Furthermore, these shares are unrestricted, that is, they have either vested or have no vesting requirements. If the bank adopts the above trading strategy, and given the beliefs of the stock market about this trading strategy, the bank share price will increase. In any given year there is a very high probability (5/6 = 83%) that the trading strategy will generate very large positive cash flow of $500 million. If the realization from the trading strategy is one of the positive cash flow outcomes (and there is an 83% probability of this), the bank share price goes up by, say, $3, -the bank declares generous bonuses to key employees, and the CEO liquidates a significant part of her equity holdings, say, worth $200 million.
To be sure, the bank CEO knows that the expected cash flow from this trading strategy is negative. Hence, there is some probability (17%) that in any given year the trading strategy will lead to the extremely negative cash flow outcome of -$5 billion. What then? In the textbook corporate finance paradigm, the bank's share price drops significantly, and, depending on the bank's equity capitalization, the bank may have to declare bankruptcy. 6 This bankruptcy or close-to-bankruptcy scenario will certainly have a collateral significant negative impact on the value of the CEO's bank stockholdings. However, if during the first few years of this trading strategy the cash flow outcomes have been positive and the CEO has liquidated significant amount of her stockholdings, even when the bank faces bankruptcy in a future year, the CEO's personal fortune may well be still quite substantial. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) Managerial Incentives Hypothesis posits that incentives generated by executive compensation programs led to excessive risk-taking by banks that benefited bank executives at the expense of the long-term shareholders. Bank executives receive significant amounts of stock and stock option as incentive compensation. If the vesting period for these stock and option grants is "long," managers will identify more closely with creating long-term shareholder value. If the vesting period for these stock and option grants is "short," managers will identify more closely with generating short term earnings, even at the expense of long-term value.
Managers that own significant amounts of vested stock and options have a strong incentive to focus on short term earnings. If these short term earnings are generated by valueenhancing projects, there would be no conflict vis-a-vis serving long-term shareholder interests.
What if managers invest in value-decreasing (negative net present value) projects that generate positive earnings in the current year (and perhaps a few subsequent years) but lead to a large negative earnings outcome after a few years? If managers and outside investors have similar understanding of the magnitude and probability of the large negative outcome, managers will be discouraged from investing in such value-decreasing projects, because stock market participants will impound the negative impact of such projects on share prices of these banks.
(The negative impact on share prices will have a similar negative effect on the value of the managers' stock and option holdings.) However, managers have discretion over the amount, substance and timing of the information about a project they release to outside investors. Hence, given the information provided the outside investors, the stock market may underweight the probability of a very negative outcome -and view a value-decreasing project as valueenhancing.
How might managers behave if they were presented with a value-decreasing (negative net present value) project that generated positive earnings in the current year (and perhaps a few subsequent years) but leads to a large negative earnings outcome after a few years? If these managers were acting in the interests of long-term shareholders, they would not invest in such a project. If the managers were not necessarily acting in the interests of long-term shareholders but in their own self-interest only, and if they owned sufficient (vested) stock and options, they 7 There is substantial evidence in the finance literature that insiders have an informational advantage and use it to generate superior returns; for example, see Ben-David and Roulstone (2010 partner with most of the other institutions in this study, and was involved in the real estate market by selling credit default swaps and other mortgage-related products to these institutions and other investors. AIG was also one of the largest recipients of TARP funds and is one of the few TARP recipients in this study that has not repaid the Treasury's investment, yet. In our discussion below we refer to AIG and the 13 other firms noted above as too-big-to-fail ( 
Data
The insider trading data comes from the Thomson Insiders database. We rely on Form 4 data filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission for this study. In addition to direct 10 It is common practice for insiders to exercise stock options only to immediately sell the stock in the open market. By making both trades simultaneously, the insider avoids using any cash to exercise the options.
11 The beneficial ownership we consider includes common stock equivalents that the individuals have immediate access to. This generally includes common stock, in-the-money and vested options, and vested restricted stock received through incentive plans. It does not include options that are not exercisable and restricted stock that has not vested. Options may not be exercisable because the market price of the stock is below the option exercise price or because the option has not vested.
3.3.Variables
The primary variable used in this study is Net Trades. This variable subtracts the dollar value of all of an insider's purchases of common stock during a fiscal year from the dollar value of all of that insider's sales of common stock during the year. Exercising options to acquire stock is considered a purchase of common stock in the calculation of Net Trades. We consider the post-trade ownership after each transaction. One information item disclosed on the Form 4 is "amount of securities beneficially owned following reported transaction." We multiply the number of shares disclosed on the Form 4 with the transaction price of the stock from the Form 4 to get the dollar value of ownership following the transaction. We add back the value of shares sold or subtract off the value of shares purchased to determine the pre-trade ownership stake.
We consider Salary and Bonus for compensation data, which represent current cash consideration. We do not directly consider stock or option grants. We analyze any stock or option compensation only when the insider converts that into cash through selling the stock or exercising the option. period at a total cost of $1,660 million. Because they typically paired these option exercises with open market sales, they did not necessarily invest $1,660 million of (pre-sale) cash to acquire these shares. Even including the option purchases, CEOs sold twice as much stock as they acquired during this period. There are two reasons why CEOs are more likely to sell their shares than buy:
a. CEOs are less well-diversified with regard to equity holdings in their bank. This situation is exacerbated given that their human capital is also tied to their company.
The size of their equity holdings might necessitate a liquidity discount if they wished to sell within a short timeframe. For these diversification and liquidity reasons, CEOs would value a dollar of their company's stock at less than a dollar.
b. CEOs receive significant grants of shares as part of their incentive compensation.
To create liquid funds from these shares, they have to sell. out-of-the-money. See, for example, Chen (2004) . In reality, the value lost after restructuring their beneficial ownership was likely less than $2,013 million. 
4.2.Net Payoff to bank CEOs during 2000-2008

4.3.Robustness check: Different sample periods
4.4.Robustness check: Comparing TBTF, L-TARP and No-TARP banks
The 
As detailed in
4.5.Robustness check: Net trades of officers and directors
In the analysis above we have focused on the trades and incentives of the CEO since he is the most significant decision maker. However, other officers and directors can have significant impact on the bank's trading/investment strategies. 
4.6.Shareholder returns to TBTF, L-TARP and No-TARP banks
4.7.Risk-taking by TBTF banks, L-TARP and No-TARP banks
In the model developed above we suggest that TBTF managers engaged in high-risk (and (1) and (2) in Table 8 suggests that Z-score of TBTF banks is significantly less than the Z-score of No-TARP banks and that Z-score of L-TARP banks is also significantly less than the Z-score of No-TARP banks.
More recently, Chesney, Stromberg and Wagner (2010) have suggested that asset writedowns are a good indicator of bank risk-taking. The evidence in columns (3), (4) and (5) in Table 8 
Solutions to excessive risk-taking by bank managers
5.1.The Restricted Equity proposal
How might we prevent the bank executives from undertaking excessively risky and valuedestroying trading or operating strategies? One solution could be to offer bank executives compensation contracts consistent with the proposal of Bhagat and Romano (2009) derivative transactions, such as a put on a broader basket of securities. In addition, to ensure that under-diversification does not result in managers taking a suboptimally low level of risk, compared to the risk preferences of shareholders (behavior that may be of particular concern as an aging executive nears retirement and may wish to protect the value of accrued shares), the incentive plan can be fine-tuned to provide a higher proportion in restricted options than restricted shares to increase the bank CEO's incentive to take risk.
Second, if executives are required to hold restricted shares and options post-retirement, it would raise concerns regarding lack of liquidity. Third, the proposal could lead to early management departures, as executives seek to convert (after the two to four year waiting period) illiquid shares and options into more liquid assets.
The concerns regarding under-diversification, lack of liquidity, and early departure are valid. To address these concerns we recommend managers be allowed to liquidate annually a small fraction of their stock and option holdings in their bank. What is the magnitude of the "small fraction?" Given the evidence in Table 4 , we recommend managers be permitted to annually liquidate about 5% to 15% of their ownership positions. Table 4 documents the rather large dollar holdings of some managers. 15% of stock holdings in 2000 would exceed $100 million for several CEOs. Allowing managers to take such a significant sum off the table would significantly lessen their incentive to serve the interests of long-term shareholders. The 85% of their stock-holdings that they still own will provide incentives to serve shareholder interests for the next several years -as they continue liquidating (up to) 15% of their holdings every year.
Hence, we also recommend that these ownership position annual liquidations be restricted to an amount of $5 million to $10 million.
If incentive compensation were constrained to restricted stock and restricted stock options, managers will attempt to circumvent this by arguing for higher, perhaps much higher, cash compensation. Higher cash compensation will tend to negate the effects of incentive compensation. For this reason, we are suggesting a limit of $2 million on annual cash compensation.
The above amounts may seem low compared to what bank executives have received during the past several decades. However, that is not necessarily the case. This proposal only limits the annual cash payoffs the executives can realize. Under this proposal, the net present value of all salary and stock compensation can be higher than they have received historically, so long as they invest in projects that lead to value creation that persists in the long-term.
To be clear, we are not recommending the Restricted Equity proposal be the basis for additional regulations. Rather the proposal is just a set of ideas for corporate boards, rather their compensation committees, and their institutional investors to consider. In implementing the proposal, we think corporate boards should be the principal decision-makers regarding:
a) The mix of restricted stock and restricted stock options a manager is awarded.
b) The amount of restricted stock and restricted stock options the manager is awarded.
c) The maximum percentage and dollar value of holdings the manager can liquidate annually.
d) Number of years post retirement/resignation for the stock and options to vest.
While our focus here is on banks, the incentives generated by the above compensation structure would be relevant for maximizing long-term shareholder value in other industries. For example, consider the cases of Enron, WorldCom and Qwest whose senior executives have been convicted of criminal violation of insider trading laws. 20 Senior executives in these companies made misleading public statements regarding the earnings of their respective companies. These misleading statements led to a temporary rise in the share prices of these companies. These executives liquidated significant amounts of their equity positions during the period while their companies' share price was temporarily inflated. If these executives'
incentive compensation had consisted of only restricted stock and restricted stock option that they could not liquidate for two to four years after their last day in office, they would not have had the financial incentive to make the abovementioned misleading statements. Hence, corporate board compensation committees and institutional investors in firms in other industries should also give the above Restricted Equity executive incentive compensation structure serious consideration.
5.2.Clawbacks
French et al (2010) in The Squam Lake Report recommend "…that government regulators require systemically important financial firms to hold back for several years a fraction of each employee's annual compensation. Employees would forfeit these holdbacks if the firm declares bankruptcy or receives extraordinary government assistance." Conceptually this proposal has merit since the clawback will discourage managers from undertaking high-risk negative net present value investments and trading strategies.
We note three concerns with this proposal. Table 4 documents that annual cash compensation (salary plus bonus) is, on average, only about 50 % of manager payoff from net trades. 21 Hence, if managers were allowed to take large sums off the table annually in the form of sales of their stock and option holdings, clawbacks of compensation might not be a major consideration for these bank managers. Second, incentives generated from the above clawback provisions are not directly aligned with that of the long-term shareholders. Decreases in firm value may have no impact on manager compensation (via the clawback provisions) as long as the firm is not "bankrupt" or recipient of "extraordinary government assistance." These same decreases in firm value, of course, have a negative impact on shareholder wealth.
Third, the implementation details would be important: How much is held back and for how long? What constitutes "bankruptcy" and "extraordinary government assistance?" BR note that, in the past, managers have successfully taken advantage of any flexibility/ambiguity provided in their incentive compensation plans at the expense of long-term shareholders.
Managers will likely take advantage of abovementioned clawback related implementation flexibility/ambiguity to benefit themselves at the expense of long-term shareholders.
22
The Restricted Equity proposal, noted above, whereby managers' incentive compensation consists solely of restricted stock and restricted stock options (that they are required to hold for two to four years post-retirement) is not subject to the above concerns. Furthermore, the Restricted Equity proposal (via the restricted stock and option holdings) provides for an automatic, ongoing, direct and proportionate impact of the change in a company's equity value on the manager's net worth. 21 For some banks cash compensation (salary plus bonus) can be less than 25% of manager payoff via net trades, for example, Lehman Brothers and Countrywide Financial.
The recently enacted Financial Reform Act mandates the SEC to require companies to adopt clawback policies; for example, see Joann Lublin "Law Sharpens 'Clawback' Rules for Improper Pay," Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2010. However, industry observers are raising concerns regarding the implementation of such clawback policies -similar to the implementation concerns noted above.
5.3.Grant-based and aggregate limitations on unwinding
Bebchuk and Fried (2010) (BF) provide an insightful set of recommendations for structuring executive incentive compensation to serve long-term shareholder interests. They recommend grant-based and aggregate restrictions on the unwinding of vested equity incentives: "All equity-based awards should be subject to aggregate limitations on unwinding so that, in each year (including a specified number of years after retirement), an executive may unwind no more than a specified percentage of her equity incentives that is not subject to grantbased limitations on unwinding at the beginning of the year."
The BF proposal has considerable merit since it focuses the attention of managers to long-term value creation by limiting their ability to liquidate their vested equity. The BF recommendations are conceptually consistent with the Restricted Equity proposal whereby managers' incentive compensation consists solely of restricted stock and restricted stock options (that they are required to hold for two to four years post-retirement). Corporate capital structure is arguably the most intensely and thoroughly researched topic in corporate finance. Any standard corporate finance textbook would argue that bankruptcy costs and financial distress costs (incurred prior to bankruptcy) are a significant determinant of a company's capital structure; for example, see Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe (2010) . Hence, companies with greater uncertainty of operating income should be financed mostly with equity.
In the U.S. about 90% of a bank's capital is debt capital, and this ratio is even higher for the larger banks, about 95%; for example, see Bolton, Mehran and Shapiro (2010) . Compared to the debt ratio in other industries, banks have one of the highest, if not the highest debt ratio; for the corporate sector as a whole -debt ratio is about 47%. Given the alleged systemic risk and resulting significant negative impact on the other sectors of the economy from large banks' going into bankruptcy (or facing serious financial distress), banks (especially the larger banks)
should move towards a much lower debt ratio. How low of a debt ratio should large banks consider? Given that large banks comprise one of the riskier industries and perhaps the riskiest in light of recent economic experience, their debt ratio should be one of the lowest in the economy and certainly in the neighborhood of the median economy-wide debt ratio of 47%.
The three solutions to excessive risk-taking by banks noted above are predicated on equity based incentives for bank managers. The high leverage implied by debt ratios in the order of 95% will magnify the impact of losses on equity value. As a bank's equity value approaches zero (as they did for some banks in 2008), equity based incentive programs lose their effectiveness in motivating managers to enhance shareholder value. Hence, for equity based incentive structures to be effective, banks should be financed with considerable more equity than they are being financed currently; we refer to this as the Restricted-Equity-MoreEquity-Capital proposal. Our recommendation for significantly greater equity in a bank's capital structure is consistent with the recent recommendations of Admati, Demarzo, Hellwig and Pfleiderer (2010) and Fama (2010) . 24 In op-eds on June 16, 2011, and October 24, 2011, the Wall Street Journal has recommended significantly higher equity capital requirements for banks.
It is also possible that if bank managers' incentive compensation is structured along the lines of the Restricted Equity proposal noted above, managers would voluntarily move to a lower debt ratio in their capital structure since this would lower the probability of bankruptcy (or serious financial distress). Lowering the debt ratio may not only serve the interests of longterm shareholders of these banks, but would also lessen the probability of alleged systemic risk resulting from the failure of one or more large banks. French et al (2010) in The Squam Lake Report propose a thoughtful solution to the current thin equity capitalization of large banks, "The government should promote a long term debt instrument that converts to equity under specific conditions. Banks would issue these bonds before a crisis and, if triggered, the automatic conversion of debt into equity would transform an undercapitalized or insolvent bank into a well-capitalized bank at no cost to taxpayers." Figure 3 provides a stylized depiction of a large bank's capital structure under three scenarios: the current situation, The Regulatory Hybrid Security proposal, and the RestrictedEquity-More-Equity-Capital proposal noted in 5.1 above.
6.2.Regulatory hybrid security
24 Fama (2010) suggests, "The simple solution is to make sure these firms have a lot more equity capital-not a little more, but a lot more, so they are not playing with other people's money. There are other people here who think that leverage is an important part of the system. I am not sure I agree with them."
A potential advantage of the Regulatory Hybrid Security proposal is it requires less equity capital upfront. However, several authors have raised concerns about the incentive and other problems the triggering mechanism (that would lead to the conversion of the hybrid capital to equity) would generate; for example, see Duffie (2010) and McDonald (2010) .
Furthermore, Admati, Demarzo, Hellwig and Pfleiderer (2010) provide a thorough and detailed analysis of the flaws in the current received wisdom that large banks should be mostly financed with debt; in other words, they question the potential advantage of the Regulatory Hybrid Security proposal's requirement of less equity capital upfront. Besides providing the correct incentives to managers to create and sustain long-term shareholder value, the RestrictedEquity-More-Equity-Capital proposal has the advantage of being simple and transparent.
Capital market participants, especially bondholders, will value simplicity and transparency in a bank's capital structure -in light of their recent experience with large banks,
6.3.Manager incentives and risk-shifting
There is a consensus in corporate finance that with risky debt outstanding, managers acting in the interest of shareholders have an incentive to invest in high-risk projects even if they are value-decreasing (negative net present value); for example, see Smith and Warner (1979) . Consistent with this argument, several authors have argued that bank CEO compensation should be restructured so as to maximize the value of bank equity and debt. For example, Bolton, Mehran and Shapiro (2010) (BMS) suggest that bank managers' compensation should be tied to the bank's default probability as reflected in their default spread (CDS).
Conceptually, we are supportive of the BMS suggestion and think it has considerable merit. However, we note two concerns with this recommendation. First, the above shareholder- a) The mix of restricted stock and restricted stock options directors are awarded.
b) The amount of restricted stock and restricted stock options directors awarded.
c) The maximum percentage and dollar value of holdings directors can liquidate annually. d) Number of years after the last board meeting for the stock and options to vest.
7.1.Mid-level managers
The Restricted Equity incentive compensation proposal noted above is appropriate for only the senior-most executives and directors in a company. The Restricted Equity incentive compensation proposal is not appropriate for mid-level managers, and even less appropriate for rank and file employees; the under-diversification problem would be a particularly serious problem for rank and file employees. Once the incentives of senior executives are aligned with that of long-term shareholders, the senior executives should be entrusted with the task of constructing incentive programs for the mid-level managers.
Summary and conclusions
Before stating our conclusions, it is important to note that executive compensation reform is not a panacea. While incentives generated by executive compensation programs led to excessive risk-taking by banks contributing to the current financial crisis, there are several more important causes of the current financial and economic crisis. salary and bonus during [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . We consider the capital losses these CEOs incur due to the dramatic share price declines in 2008. We compare the shareholder returns for these 14 TBTF banks and the 37 No-TBTF banks. Finally, we consider three measures of risk-taking by these banks: the bank's Z-score, the bank's asset write-downs, and whether or not a bank borrows capital from various Fed bailout programs, and the amount of such capital.
Our results are mostly consistent with and supportive of the findings of Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann (2010) , that is, managerial incentives matter -incentives generated by executive compensation programs led to excessive risk-taking by banks contributing to the current financial crisis. Also, our results are generally not supportive of the conclusions of Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) that the poor performance of banks during the crisis was the result of unforeseen risk.
We recommend the following compensation structure for senior bank executives (the Restricted Equity proposal): Executive incentive compensation should only consist of restricted stock and restricted stock options -restricted in the sense that the executive cannot sell the shares or exercise the options for two to four years after their last day in office. However, to address liquidity concerns, managers should be permitted to annually liquidate about 5% to 15% of their ownership positions, but these ownership position annual liquidations should be restricted to an amount of $5 million to $10 million. This compensation structure will provide the managers stronger incentives to work in the interests of long-term shareholders, and avoid excessive risk-taking. 30 Finally, these recommendations should not necessitate new 30 The above amounts may seem low compared to what bank executives have received during the past several decades. However, that is not necessarily the case. This proposal only limits the annual cash payoffs the executives can realize. Under this proposal, the net present value of all salary and stock compensation can be regulations; these policies should be implemented by corporate boards, taking into account specific firm and executive situations to craft compensation structures that are in the best longterm interests of the institution itself.
The above incentive compensation proposal is consistent with several recent theoretical papers which suggest that a significant component of incentive compensation should consist of stock and stock options with long vesting periods; for example, see Edmans et al (2010) , and Peng and Roell (2009) . If these vesting periods were "sufficiently long" they would be similar to the above proposal.
The Restricted Equity proposal logically leads to a complementary proposal regarding a bank's capital structure: The high leverage implied by debt ratios in the order of 95% (as was the case for many large banks in 2008) will magnify the impact of losses on equity value. As banks' equity values approach zero (as they did for some banks in 2008), equity based incentive programs lose their effectiveness in motivating managers to enhance shareholder value. Hence, for equity based incentive structures to be effective, banks should be financed with considerable more equity than they are being financed with currently. Our recommendation for significantly greater equity in a bank's capital structure is consistent with the recent recommendations of Admati, Demarzo, Hellwig and Pfleiderer (2010) and Fama (2010) . Also, in an op-ed on June 16, 2011, the Wall Street Journal has recommended significantly higher equity capital requirements for banks.
higher than they have received historically, so long as they invest in projects that lead to value creation that persists in the long-term.
While our focus here is on banks, the incentives generated by the above compensation structure would be relevant for maximizing long-term shareholder value in other industries.
Hence, corporate board compensation committees and institutional investors in firms in other industries should also give the above executive incentive compensation structure serious consideration. Additionally, if banks and other firms want to establish a Culture of Ownership for their officers, incentive compensation policies such as those recommended in this study need to be established to better match the incentives of insiders and long-term outside investors. Finally, we suggest that directors should adopt a similar incentive compensation structure with regard to their own incentive compensation.
